



The Self-Effacing Functionality of Blame
Matthieu Queloz
This paper puts forward an account of blame combining two ideas that are usually set
up against each other: that blame performs an important function, and that blame
is justified by the moral reasons making people blameworthy rather than by its
functionality. The paper argues that blame could not have developed in a purely
instrumental form, and that its functionality itself demands that its functionality
be effaced in favour of non-instrumental reasons for blame—its functionality is
self-effacing. This notion is sharpened and it is shown how it offers an alternative to
instrumentalist or consequentialist accounts of blamewhichpreserves their animating
insight while avoiding their weaknesses by recasting that insight in an explanatory
role.This not only allows one to do better justice to the authority and autonomy of non-
instrumental reasons for blame, but also reveals that autonomy to be a precondition
of blame’s functionality. Unlike rival accounts, it also avoids the “alienation effect” that
renders blame unstable under reflection by undercutting the authority of the moral
reasons which enable it to perform its function in the first place. It instead yields a
vindicatory explanation that strengthens our confidence in those moral reasons.
ABSTRACT
1. Introduction
T hose impressed by the thought that blame is a tool performing an im-portant function in human life have tended to combine this thought with
another: that blame is justified by its functionality.1 Instrumentalist or conse-
quentialist proposals involving this Justification Claim have a distinguished
history, and they are now in the ascendant again.2 But they continue to meet
1 A number of sophisticated accounts—including Vargas (2013, 2008), McGeer (2013, 2014,
2015), and Jefferson (2019)—have breathed new life into the idea that blame is justified by
its functionality (at the level of the act of blame or of the practice). Though much of this
paper is devoted to demarcating my position from theirs, this belies the extent to which I
have profited from their work.
2 See Schlick (1939), Nowell-Smith (1948), Smart (1961), Dennett (1984), Bennett (2002), Var-
gas (2013, 2008), McGeer (2013, 2014, 2015), Miller (2017, 2014), Fricker (2016, forthcoming),
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with great resistance from the majority of philosophers, who are more im-
pressed by the thought that blame is a matter of tracking blameworthiness,
and that blame is justified bymoral reasons—reasons articulating why people
merit blame—rather than by instrumental reasons.
My aim in this paper is to offer an irenic account that finds a place for the
thought that blame performs important functions while divorcing it from the
thought that blame is justified by its functionality. Blame is justified bymoral
rather than instrumental reasons, but this fact itself is explained by functional
demands on the practice: the functionality of blame itself demands that it
be justified by reasons other than the instrumental reasons that figure in its
explanation; hence, the functionality of blame effaces itself in favour of moral
reasons governing its appropriateness, but for functional reasons, making the
functionality of blame self -effacing.
I proceed as follows: in §2, I provide a vindicatory explanation of blame’s
non-instrumental character: an explanation that is orthogonal to the justifi-
cation of blame, but that can nevertheless strengthen our confidence in the
practice and render us more receptive to the non-instrumental reasons at
work in it by showing us why the functionality of the practice itself requires
blame to be allocated non-instrumentally. This amounts to the self -effacing
functionality account of blame, which I sharpen and define more precisely in
§3. In §4, finally, I show how this self-effacing functionality account differs
from other instrumentalist or consequentialist accounts in ways that preserve
their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses.
Tsai (2017), and Jefferson (2019), among others. Vargas (forthcoming-a) provides a histori-
cal overview. In his usage, “instrumentalist” refers to any view highlighting instrumental
considerations, while “consequentialist” is reserved for views with a connection to conse-
quentialism in normative ethics. For present purposes, however, the important distinction
is that between justifications and explanations of blame in this vein.
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2. Why Bare Blame Does Not Work
Multiple functions have been attributed to blame: it has been described as a
device for protesting, for developing the ability of agents to recognize and re-
spond to moral considerations, and for generating common knowledge about
what we owe to each other as a result of wrongdoing.3 But as proponents of
desert-based views have been quick to point out, instrumental considerations
seem to be neither here nor there in determining when blame is appropri-
ate—indeed, blame that is guided by instrumental considerations can appear
positively disrespectful or manipulative.4 This feature of blame—let us call it
the non-instrumental character of blame, the fact that most of the time, the
practice of blame is not understood by participants in instrumental terms—is
recognized even by the most uncompromising instrumentalists, though they
may consider it a flaw inviting revision.5
But why does blame have this non-instrumental character? Could there
have been a “bare blame”-society which had a nakedly instrumental form of
blame? By considering such a “bare blame”-society and identifying just why
bare blame must remain ill-equipped to fulfil its function, we can identify the
practical pressures driving the emergence of the non-instrumental character
of blame. This will indicate good reasons to doubt recent instrumentalist
attempts—by Manuel Vargas (2013, 2008), Victoria McGeer (2013, 2014, 2015),
Dale Miller (2017, 2014), and Anneli Jefferson (2019), among others—to argue
that the instrumental consequences of having a practice of blame are what
justifies blame.
3 See Tognazzini and Coates (2018), Vargas (forthcoming-a), and Sliwa (forthcoming) for
overviews.
4 This is what McGeer dubs “the anti-regulation concern” (2013, 176).
5 Smart (1961) and Arneson (2003) are examples. Vargas (2013) and McGeer (2015) advocate
more qualified forms of revisionism. On revisionism, see McCormick (2017) and Vargas
(forthcoming-b).
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The guiding intuition of instrumentalist approaches to blame is that blame
is a device by which to regulate the behaviour of those who are out of step
with the community’s moral sensibility or insufficiently responsive to moral
considerations.6Of course,not every device that aims to regulate the behaviour
of offenders against the prevailingmoral sensibility qualifies as a formof blame.
Blame is, specifically, an instrument that helps us to regulate behaviour by
rendering agents more responsive to moral reasons, in particular by explicitly
alerting them to, and perhaps sanctioning them for, their past failures to
respond sufficiently to particular reasons on particular occasions (as opposed
to rendering them more responsive to moral reasons through other means,
such as positive reinforcement strategies). Our question then is: could there
be a stable form of blame that was understood entirely in such instrumental
terms?
From the point of view most readily and most comfortably taken up in
thinking about blame, that of the blaming party, it is not obvious why bare
blame could not work. One could resolve to respond to actions betraying insuf-
ficient responsiveness to moral reasons with bare blame. Note that an irritated
grunt or some other inarticulate expression of feeling would not do the job,
for while this would communicate to the recipient that the action was unwel-
come, and iterations of this pattern might even succeed in communicating
that the action was permanently unwelcome, it could only instil in the recipi-
ent a disposition to avoid performing the action in the presence of the blamer
(“Tom doesn’t seem to like it when I torture kittens; I’d better do it when he
is not looking”). It would do nothing to foster a more general recognition of
themoral reason to act otherwise. Even in its most primitive form, therefore,
6 Despite its dominating presence in philosophy, blame is far from being the unique solution to
this problem.There are numerous techniques by which to remedy failures in responsiveness
to moral reasons—many farmore coercive than blame, as totalitarian regimes and dystopian
literature remind us. Some of these techniques, such as the emulation of exemplars, are
practiced alongside blame even in societies that deny themselves more coercive resources.
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bare blame would need to involve some articulation of the reason one had to
act otherwise.
Thismay already be thought to present a difficulty for bare blame, since the
blamer would necessarily, in the process of blaming, point to a moral reason.
But we can still conceive of the bare blamer, not altogether unrealistically, as a
hypocritical moralist, who remains unmoved by the reason articulated in the
act of blaming while nonetheless recognizing that there is an instrumental
reason to get others to respond to that moral reason.7 Faced with some agent B
whodisregarded somemoral reasonX, for example, the content of the thoughts
of some blamerA could be: “Though I don’t care at all aboutXmyself, things go
better if people in general are responsive to X, so if, by blaming B, I succeed in
rendering him more responsive to X, I will have been instrumentally justified
in blaming B.” Such a blamer would still be acting in an entirely instrumental
spirit, and in the blamer’s eyes, the act of blame would be justified solely in
terms of its functionality: in line with the Justification Claim, blame would be
justified if and when it was effective, and unjustified otherwise.
But what about the recipient of blame? It is here that the instrumental
mindset betrays its limits and we see why bare blame cannot do the work
required of it: blame cannot normally be effective unless the recipient thinks it
is justified, and unlike the blamer, the recipient cannot coherently understand
the justification for blame as purely instrumental, which means that justified
blame will need to be justified by something other than instrumental reasons.
Since blamers are sometimes the blamed, this entails that blame can only be
effective in a community in which each member understands blame (at least
some of the time) as justified by something other than its functionality.
7 The case where the entire community consists of hypocritical moralists raises difficulties of
its own, because while we can make practical sense of an isolated amoralist, we cannot make
sense of a society of amoralists. It may be possible for an individual to live outside the ethical
life, but no human community can get by without some minimal ethical consciousness that
stakes claims against self-interest (Williams 2011, 32, 51).
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Let us examine the argument in more detail. It involves three steps: first,
in the basic case, blame cannot be effective unless the recipient thinks it is jus-
tified, for when blame is not justified from the recipient’s point of view, it must
remain mere browbeating and cannot hope to become a successful instance
of blame.8 It might intimidate and breed fear or resentment; but it certainly
could not elicit remorse, self-reproach, guilt, contrition, penitence, or other
markers of effective blame, i.e. blame resulting in enhanced responsiveness to
a moral reason one was previously unresponsive to.
The second step is that since getting the recipient to care about X is the
success criterion for the act of blame, the recipient cannot remain indifferent
to X while seeing the act of blaming as justified. The recipient of blame cannot
coherently think: “Though I don’t care at all about X myself, things go better if
people in general are responsive to X, so since, by blaming me,A has rendered
me more responsive to X, A was instrumentally justified in blaming me.” For
the recipient to come to see the act of blaming as justified, the action that
forms the focus of blame must reveal itself to have been accompanied by
what Simon Blackburn calls “the hovering ‘should’” (2015, 222): there needs
to be some reason to act otherwise in the offing which the recipient comes
to recognize. It is the presence of that hovering “should” that responses such
as remorse or self-reproach register. Blame thus cannot be effective without
turning recipients’ gaze back onto their actions and the moral reasons they
proved insufficiently responsive to.
The third step is that once thesemoral reasons are disclosed to the recipient,
they justify not only acting otherwise, but also being blamed for failing to do
so. If the function of blame is to foster responsiveness to moral reasons in the
recipient, the recipient could not take blame to be justified merely on the basis
8 SeeWilliams (1995a, 15). One can of course imagine more complicated cases in which blame
ends up being justified even though the recipient does not consider it justified, for instance
because it initiates an exchange between blamer and recipient that results in the blamer
becoming more responsive to a moral reason.
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of its functionality, because the thought of blame’s functionality would always
come either too early or too late. It would come too early if the change that the
act of blaming was supposed to effect in the recipient had not yet taken place,
because then the act of blaming would not yet have proven functional; and it
would come too late if the change had taken place but had thereby rendered the
recipient sensitive to the moral reason in virtue of which the recipient was in
fact blameworthy, because then the act of blaming would already be justified
by something other than its functionality. If what blame is an instrument for
is cultivating responsiveness to moral reasons in the recipient, therefore, it
can never be justified without becoming justified by something other than
instrumental reasons, for it cannot succeed without alerting the recipient
to the moral reasons in virtue of which the recipient is blameworthy, and it
cannot alert the recipient to these reasons without rendering the act of blame
justified by those reasons in the eyes of the recipient.
The key insight brought out by considering bare blame is thus that in
order to be instrumental in regulating behaviour, the practice of blame must,
at least in the eyes of its recipients, bemore than instrumental, for as long as
the participants in the practice of blame think of it in purely instrumental
terms, as justified only by its efficacy as a tool, blame will normally fail to be
effective. This highlights something that is often missed by accounts which
duly acknowledge that blame combines instrumental and non-instrumental
aspects, namely the functional connection between instrumental and non-
instrumental aspects of blame.
The non-instrumental character of blame thus forms what might be called
a precondition of functionality:
Precondition of Functionality:
Some state of affairs p is a precondition of the functionality of something
discharging function F iff F can be discharged only if p is the case.
We can then specify the functional connection between the instrumental
and the non-instrumental aspects of blame as follows: blame’s having a non-
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instrumental character is a precondition of the functionality of blame as a tool
for the cultivation of responsiveness to moral reasons. To grasp this functional
connection is to grasp the inherently self-reinforcing nature andpractical value
of blame’s peculiar combination of instrumental andnon-instrumental aspects.
By grasping it, we not only acknowledge the non-instrumental character of
blame, but are alsomade comfortable with it, because it receives a demystifying
and vindicatory explanation: blame turns out to be a practice exhibiting self -
effacing functionality.9
3. Self-Effacing Functionality
To say that blame is a self-effacingly functional practice is to say that it is
functional, but only insofar as it is sustained by reasons that are autonomous,
i.e. not conditional on the practice’s functionality. As a result, the functionality
of blame will be either secondary or entirely absent from the participants’
minds as they engage in the practice, but for functional reasons. Hence the
claim that the functionality of blame is self-effacing.
This claim can be statedmore precisely by saying that the practice of blame
satisfies the following four conditions:10
(a) Functionality: the practice is functional, i.e. it makes a difference to
the lives of those who engage in it which can be shown to be a useful
difference in light of some of their individual or social needs.
(b) Autonomy: the practice is guided and sustained by motives and rea-
sons that are not conditional on its functionality and are in that sense
autonomous.
9 It thus stands with blamemuch as it stands with the practice of valuing the truth intrinsically
according to Williams (2002), though Williams does not put it in terms of self-effacing
functionality. See Queloz (2018, forthcoming).
10 Here I draw, with modifications, on Queloz (2018, 14).
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(c) Dependence: the practice can be functional only insofar as it satisfies (b),
i.e. it would be ineffective if guided and sustained merely by motives
and reasons that were conditional on its functionality.
(d) Explanatory Connection: the practice fulfils (b) because of (c), i.e. there
is an explanatory connection between its autonomy and the fact that its
functionality depends on its autonomy. This demarcates cases of self-
effacing functionality from cases of contingently effaced functionality,
in which a practice becomes guided and sustained by autonomous
considerations for reasons that have nothing to do with the practice’s
functionality (an originally instrumentally motivated practice might
be harnessed and reinterpreted by a religious movement, for example).
This account of blame as exhibiting the FADE structure (Functionality, Au-
tonomy, Dependence, and an Explanatory connection between the latter two)
explains why its functionality is not obvious to participants, having faded
from view because that very functionality requires that it efface itself in favour
of autonomous considerations. Yet because of (d), the explanatory connection,
the functionality is not contingently effaced, as it would be if the practice of
blame had developed a non-instrumental character for reasons that had noth-
ing to do with its underlying function. Nor does the self-effacing functionality
account correspond to the functional dynamics familiar from ideology cri-
tique, where awareness of a practice’s function is radically incompatible with
confident engagement in it. On the self-effacing functionality account, blame
does not necessarily involve blindness to its function; participants can become
fully conscious of the functionality of the practice without the insight into the
functionality having a destabilizing effect on the practice (a point I return to
in the next section).
The self-effacing functionality account of blame is irenic because it com-
bines the thought that blame performs a function with the thought that instru-
mental considerations fail to capture the nature and justification of blame: it
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preserves the insight that blame serves a function and even extends its reach by
exhibiting the non-instrumental aspects of blame as possessing a functionalist
rationale; yet it also vindicates those who resist a functionalist understand-
ing of blame by underscoring the poverty of pure functionalism: an account
which insisted on understanding blame entirely in instrumental terms would
find itself at a loss to explain blame’s functionality.11
4. Upshot and Advantages of the Self-Effacing Functionality Account
Themark of a truly irenic account, a cynic might say, is that it proves a dis-
appointment to all parties. Each side recognizes enough material in the pre-
cariously balanced middle position—either its own or that of the opposing
side—to conclude that it must ultimately collapse one way or the other. For
the self-effacing functionality account of blame, this takes the form of asking
either why the position does not collapse into a purely desert-based view that
is oblivious to function, or why it does not collapse into a revisionist instru-
mentalism which takes the insight into the function to be what really justifies
11 This provides us with a distinctive way of developing the notoriously elusive ending of P. F.
Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”: “It is far from wrong to emphasize the efficacy of all
those practices which express or manifest our moral attitudes, in regulating behaviour in
ways considered desirable,” he writes. “What is wrong is to forget that these practices, and
their reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not
merely devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes,” for “the very understanding
of the kind of efficacy these expressions of our attitudes have turns on our remembering
this” (1974, 25). If we wish to understand the efficacy of blame, in other words, we must
recognize that it is efficacy of a peculiar kind, one that we cannot understand unless we
recognize that the practice really expressesmoral and not just instrumental attitudes. This is
more than just the suggestion that we need a two-eyed view of blame—a view that duly takes
note of both its instrumental and its non-instrumental character. It involves the further idea
that we need such a two-eyed view in order to understand the peculiar “kind of efficacy” at
work in these cases, which suggests that the mark of that efficacy is the functional connection
between the instrumental and the non-instrumental—a connection which can be more
fully brought to light using the notion of self-effacing functionality.
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blame and undertakes to overrule desert-based considerations wherever this
optimizes functionality.
In addressing these concerns, the critical question is how we conceive
of the normative role and relative weight of the instrumental and non-
instrumental reasons for blame: do they explain or justify, and if the latter,
how much justificatory weight do they possess? While we have so far con-
sidered why blame, if understood in instrumental terms, must come to be
understood also in non-instrumental terms, little has been said about the re-
lation between these different understandings of blame. If the instrumental
considerations are taken to be completely normatively inert, the self-effacing
functionality account indeed threatens to collapse into a purely desert-based
view. If, on the other hand, instrumental considerations are taken to be so
normatively powerful that they overrule non-instrumental considerations
and provide the true justification for blame (either at the level of individual
acts of blaming or at the level of the practice), the account collapses into the
kind of instrumentalist position defended notably by Victoria McGeer (2013,
2015) and Manuel Vargas (2013, 2015a, 2015b).
Accordingly, my aim in this section is to develop a stable and distinctive
account of how, on the self-effacing functionality account, the normative
role and relative weight of instrumental and non-instrumental reasons for
blame can be understood. This will allow us to contrast it with rival accounts
and bring out its comparative strengths. I shall argue that the self-effacing
functionality account respects the default authority of our non-instrumental
reasons for blame by recasting the insight into the functionality of blame in
an explanatory role; that unlike rival accounts, it does not miss the functional
connection between instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of blame; and
that it avoids what I shall call the alienation effect characteristic of accounts
committed to the Justification Claim.
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4.1 The Authority of Function-Based Accounts: Explanation vs. Justification
By itself, the insight into the self-effacing functionality of blame does not fully
determine what normative role and weight we should give to it. In thinking
about this, it is important to bear in mind a remark of Bernard Williams’s, to
the effect that when we assess the strengths and weaknesses of some theoret-
ical account of a practice, we ultimately do so by reference to our everyday
judgements and our pre-theoretical sense of the life that the theoretical ac-
count was supposed to help us to lead, and in many cases, the reasons that a
practice immediately provides will often “simply count as stronger than any
reason that might be advanced for it” (2011, 127).12 Theoretical explanations
or justifications of our everyday practices do not possess more authority sim-
ply in virtue of being theoretical or systematic. What authority they may have
comes from the way they tie in with what is or should be important to us
already.
Where the practice of blame is concerned, it likewise seems to me that
the reasons that guide and flow from our everyday first-order judgements
of blameworthiness simply count as stronger than the reasons that guide and
flow from our theoretical second-order judgements about those judgements.
This is not to deny that there can be theoretical accounts of practices that end
up sapping the authority from our first-order reasoning practices (by giving
us compelling reasons to think that our adherence to those practices involves
some radical form of deception, for instance).13 But the onus is on the side of
theory to show why it should be granted more authority than the reasons we
immediately have for thinking that someone does or does not merit blame.
12 Williams’s example is a theoretical account of the concept person that is supposed to give us
reasons to revise our ethical priorities in our dealings with each other, but ends up seeming
less authoritative than the concepts and reasons it is meant to replace (2011, 126–128).
13 Under which conditions reasons yielded by a theoretical account have sufficient authority
to overrule reasons that are more directly at work in our experience is a complex issue I
shall not go into here. Suffice it to say that I do take the authority of first-order reasons to
be defeasible.
13 • Matthieu Queloz
I suspect that appreciation of this fact is at the root of much discomfort
with instrumentalist or consequentialist theories, and in particular with the
Justification Claim. The moment the functionality of blame is cast in a justifi-
catory role and presented as being what really justifies blame—either the act
of blame, as in McGeer’s (2013, 2015) theory, or the practice of blame, as in
Vargas’s (2013, 2015a, 2015b)—one is asked to grant instrumental considera-
tionsmore authority than the non-instrumental considerations that guide our
everyday judgements of blameworthiness, and to revise one’s blaming prac-
tices accordingly. But even if one is willing to grant them some authority, one
understandably feels queasy, in the absence of a fuller account of why the in-
strumental considerations advanced by a philosophical theory should have
such justificatory weight, about granting them so much authority over one’s
life.
For this reason, it seems to me better to recast the insight into the func-
tionality of blame in a different role and to relocate it from the sphere of
justification to the sphere of explanation.The practical needs of human beings
trying to live together explain why they developed the practice of blame and
why it comes to be guided by non-instrumental reasons. This is an account
of blame in terms of its consequences, but it is an explanatory consequential-
ism that issues in a non-consequentialist picture of blame. The instrumental
considerations it advances remain orthogonal to the business of justifying
blame. Like the accounts of McGeer and Vargas, the self-effacing functional-
ity account is function-based, but the insight into the functionality of blame
is situated along the axis of explanation, buttressing rather than competing
with the reasons at work in the game of justifying blame.14
14 Note that this approach also remains distinct from evolutionary approaches drawing onErnst
Mayr’s distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations: proximate explanations
concern the mechanism by which certain effects are generated and thus answer “How?”-
questions, whereas ultimate explanations concern the evolutionary function of having a
mechanism with these effects and thus answer “Why?”-questions (Scott-Phillips et al. 2011).
But such evolutionary approaches, like other instrumentalist or consequentialist accounts,
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This is not to say that if the insight into the functionality of blame is situated
along the axis of explanation rather than justification, it leaves everything as
it was; on the contrary, the account of blame as a self-effacingly functional
practice is a prime example of what Williams calls a vindicatory explanation:
an explanation that strengthens our confidence in the practice of blame and
in the reasons we take to justify it, because it suggests that this practice, along
with the reasons that figure in it, is not just a fetish, a product of deception,
or an irrational holdover from the enchanted world, but something that it
makes sense for us to cultivate, because it provides an important solution to a
problem that any human society needs to solve on a continual basis.15
Indeed, such an explanation might even be taken to indicate that blame
makes particular sense for us who live in heterogenous liberal societies. If
blame responds to a need for moral alignment, a need to cultivate responsive-
ness to the same moral reasons, it follows that the more internally diverse
societies are, the more there is a need for techniques of this kind, especially in
the absence of more draconian ways of responding to that need. In societies
that are ethically highly homogenous or that have no qualms about resort-
ing to coercion or force to secure alignment, there may be less of a need for
blame. But to the extent that a society is pluralistic and heterogenous and
that it denies itself the use of many alternative tools, that society will have a
correspondingly greater need for blame.
At the same time, explanatory reflection on the function of blame is also
notwithout a critical edge. AsMiranda Fricker (2016, forthcoming) has argued,
seeing the point of blame also gives us a sense ofwhen blame becomes pointless
or even dysfunctional. This is not the same as showing that an instance of
invite one to see the moral reasons tracked by blame merely as the mechanism by which
blame operates, and the regulatory function of blame as the real rationale or justification
for having such a mechanism. They thus also subscribe to the Justification Claim which the
self-effacing functionality account rejects.
15 See Williams (2002, 36–37, 263; 1999, 258; 2009, 198–210; 2014, 410). As Williams observes
(2002, 283n219), his usage of the term is broader than David Wiggins’s.
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blame is unjustified. Nor does it show that the entire practice of blame is
unjustified. But it can drain our confidence in particular excrescences of the
practice, particularly where they take the form of a fiat justitia, ruat coelum
attitude (“Let there be justice, even should the heavens fall!”). By rendering
us more receptive to the thought that blame may not be our best option even
where it is fully justified, a reflective understanding of why we go in for blame
can inform the way we engage in it even if it does not provide direct input to
blame’s justificatory logic.
The first important difference between the self-effacing functionality ac-
count and accounts subscribing to the Justification Claim is therefore this: for
the latter, the instrumental considerations discernible from an external per-
spective on blame justify what we see from the internal perspective, whereas
for the self-effacing functionality theorist, authority resides primarily in the
non-instrumental considerations to which blame is taken to answer inside
the practice. The instrumental considerations visible from the external per-
spective serve in the first instance not to justify, but to explain the way we
think as participants in the practice of blame.16
4.2 The Functional Connection
The second difference is that while instrumentalist or consequentialist ac-
counts typically acknowledge that blame involves both instrumental and
non-instrumental aspects, they miss the functional connection between the
two aspects, making it look like a mere contingency of history that blame
should display this combination of aspects. By contrast, the insight into the
16 The contrast is even starker if the Justification Claim is coupled with a consequentialism that
applies systematically across ethics: whatever authority the non-instrumental reasons for
blame possess must then derive from the fact that treating these considerations as reasons
appears, at the reflective level, conducive to the production of the states of affairs that are
the real justifiers. For the self-effacing functionality theorist, by contrast, the considerations
that guide us at the first-order level are independently—if defeasibly—authoritative in a
way that does not depend on validation by the consequentialist calculus.
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self-effacing functionality of blame is the insight into why the justification
and the functionality of blamemust come apart: why it would not serve just
as well to have an understanding of blame which looked through the moral
features actually tracked by blame to the benefits of tracking these features.
This functional connection lends succour to the idea that the insight into
the functionality of blame is best cast in an explanatory role, because it shows,
against the Justification Claim, that there are good functional reasons why
the justification for blame not only is, but should be a moral rather than an
instrumental one. Since blame can only perform its function if recipients
in particular see it as justified by moral reasons, the suggestion that its jus-
tification could be based instead in its instrumental value then emerges as
a conflation of the explanatory and the justificatory which threatens to rob
blame of its functionality. It is inherent to the functional demands on blame as
a tool by which to cultivate responsiveness to moral reasons that its successful
deployment must introduce a new, non-instrumental standard of justification
that swamps the explanatorily prior, instrumental justification for blame.
4.3 The Alienation Effect
The third difference, finally, is that instrumentalist or consequentialist ac-
counts struggle to accommodate a tension between the spirit involved in the
practice of blame and the spirit involved in grasping its functionality, whereas
the self-effacing functionality account generates no such tension in the first
place. In saying that there is a tension in this area, we must work carefully
to recover the relevant idea from the rubble of past wars over utilitarianism,
naturalism, functionalism, or evolutionary psychology.17 To bring out the ten-
sion at issue, let us first assume that the internal view we normally take of
blame as participants in the practice is the following:
17 See Stocker (1976), Railton (2003), Sagar (2014), McGeer (2014), Doris (2015), Smyth (2019),
and Jefferson (2019). With the exception of Smyth’s treatment, however, the tensions ad-
dressed all seem to me subtly different from the one at issue here.
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Internal View:
Blame is justified iff someone is blameworthy in virtue of having exhibited
insufficient responsiveness to some moral reason.
Given this internal view of blame, there are then various external views
of blame with which it might be paired. The one that most plainly generates
a tension with the internal view is what might be called the external view of
pure instrumentalism:
Pure Instrumentalism:
Blame is justified iff it produces certain desirable consequences.
Here there clearly is a tension, because the external view of the justification
for blame straightforwardly conflicts with the internal view: either blame is
justified only insofar as it tracks blameworthiness, or it is justified only insofar
as it produces certain consequences, but it cannot be both. One way to resolve
this tension is to adopt a ferociously revisionist instrumentalism maintaining
that the external view should displace the internal one, so that blame comes to
be understood in instrumental terms all the way down. But while this would
resolve the tension, we saw that there is reason to think that it would do so
at the cost of blame’s functionality. Some way must therefore be found to
accommodate the internal, desert-based view of blame within the external,
function-based one.
The external views of blame proposed by McGeer and Vargas can be seen
as doing precisely that. They are examples of what might be called the external
view of accommodating instrumentalism:
Accommodating Instrumentalism:
Blame is justified iff it produces certain desirable consequences, but it does
this by being understood from the internal perspective as being justified iff
someone is blameworthy in virtue of having exhibited insufficient respon-
siveness to some moral reason.
Though better concealed, there remains a tension here, because from the
external perspective, blame is really justified only by its functionality, and
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while this is taken to justify treating blame as justified by something other
than its functionality, it does not present blame as being justified by something
other than its functionality. From the external perspective, the practice of
treating blame as justified by something other than its functionality must
appear as a mere useful pretence. This is not to say that it also appears this way
from the internal perspective; we can grant that the internal view of blame,
considered by itself, can draw on enough conceptual and emotional resources
to take the thought that blame is non-instrumentally justified beyond mere
pretence. The problem arises rather from the combination of the internal with
the external view, because the external view of the internal justification for
blame undercuts it by presenting it as merely instrumental, thus alienating
one from the normative bindingness of the moral reasons justifying blame
from the internal view. This alienation effect is not altogether unlike what
the playwright Bertolt Brecht called the Verfremdungseffekt, which is often
translated as the distancing or alienation effect, but I more particularly have
in mind the effect whereby reflection on why we came to think of blame as
we do saps the normative authority of the reasons internal to the practice of
blame by revealing a deeper justification for that practice.18
This tension in the instrumentalist or consequentialist account is one that
McGeer (2014, §3), for example, takes seriously. The strategy that McGeer
recommends to accommodate it follows Philip Pettit’s proposal that we should
immerse ourselves fully in the internal view of blame while outsourcing the
control that is supposed to come from external reflection: we should rely
on “red lights”—cues from the environment indicating that a situation is
18 Smyth speaks in this context of “reflectively induced practical alienation” (2019, 193). Bran-
dom also speaks of alienation to refer to the threat that the insight into our own role in
instituting norms constitutes for our appreciation of their normative force or bindingness
(2019, 30). See also Railton (1984) for a differentiation between various specific forms of
alienation that do not quite align with the one at issue here. Schacht (1970) traces the term’s
rich career from Hegel via Marx to the existentialists.
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abnormal—to prompt ascent to the level of consequentialist reflection only
when necessary.19
Some of the most forceful doubts over whether this could be done have
been voiced by Williams. As Williams points out, an account of blame sub-
scribing to the Justification Claim “most naturally fits a situation in which
those who understand the justification, and those whose behaviour is being
modified, are not the same people” (1995a, 15). It yields a “Government House”
account of blame akin to what Williams dubbed Government House utilitari-
anism (1995b, 166), and such a situation must be “inconsistent with ideals of
social transparency” (1995a, 15).
To sidestep such concerns about transparency, a second possibility—of
which the strategy advocated by McGeer is a variant—is to compartmentalize
the individual consciousness, relieving the tension using some distinction
between theory and practice or reflection and action: keeping one’s gaze firmly
fixed on considerations of blameworthiness when absorbed in the practice,
one would then only consider blame’s efficacy off-duty, in the “cool hour”
reflection, or only when prompted by “red lights.” But Williams made it clear
that on his view, such compartmentalizing distinctions possess no real “saving
power” (1995b, 165). If there is a tension, it will manifest itself even in such a
compartmentalized mind in the long run.
A third possibility is to differentiate, not between two sets of people or
two stretches of time, but between two styles of thought that the same per-
son can engage in simultaneously. But here also, Williams argues, the same
tension is bound to manifest itself between the view we take of things in the
consequentialist style of thought and the view we take of things in our intu-
itive responses and dispositions, because both styles of thought have to be
part of the same life, which raises the question of how they can be integrated.
Merely driving a wedge between internal and external thinking about blame
19 See Pettit (2012) and McGeer (2014).
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by saying that it happens at different times or in different styles will not suffice
to eliminate this tension. It may prevent confusions and conflations, but the
question of how these two perspectives relate to each other cannot be shirked
indefinitely: at the end of the day, the two perspectives have to be integrated
into a single life.
The tension stems from the fact that our responses, attitudes, and disposi-
tions are not just black-box mechanisms that can be exhaustively described
in terms of their inputs and outputs. As Williams urges in an echo of Straw-
son, they “constitute a way of seeing the situation,” and the problem is that
“you cannot combine seeing the situation in that way, from the point of view
of those dispositions” (2006, 80), with seeing it in the consequentialist style,
in which the dispositions are merely a means towards the bringing about of
some valuable effects or states of affairs. As soon as you see blame not merely
as explained by its functionality, but as justified by it—as soon, that is, as you
take on board the Justificatory Claim—the effects of blame are presented to
practical deliberation in the same normative role as moral reasons, compet-
ing with them and compromising their autonomy as justificatory input to
the practice of blame. And what are recipients of blame then to think, when
they consider whether the blame is justified? The combination of moral and
functional justification is bound to unravel under reflection, because taking
blame to be justified by its functionality alienates one from the autonomous
moral reasons for blame, and alienation from those reasons robs blame of its
functionality.
Crucially, the claim is not that you cannot combine seeing the situation
from a point of view that focuses on the effects of having certain dispositions
and seeing it from a point of view that focuses on the moral reasons visi-
ble from those dispositions. That is a combination attempted by any broadly
functionalist reflection on moral dispositions, including the self-effacing func-
tionality account of blame.
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The claim is rather this: while participants in the practice of blame can
unproblematically instrumentalize blame by coming to see the attitudes and
dispositions constituting the machinery of blame as a machinery, they cannot
unproblematically come to see it as justified by its effects as a machinery, be-
cause the relevant attitudes and dispositions are expressed precisely in seeing
blame as justified by moral reasons, and the kind of normative bindingness
involved in autonomous moral reasons simply does not admit of regulatory
supervision by reflection on the efficacy of heeding them. Moral practices like
blame resist being understood in instrumental terms, because the dispositions,
concerns, and standards they embody demand to be understood indepen-
dently from instrumental concerns, as making normatively binding claims
on us that are characterized by their practical necessity or unconditionality.20
They are precisely not conditional on whether heeding them facilitates the sat-
isfaction of antecedent ends. If, from the external perspective, blame presents
itself tome as justified by its consequences, then, by accepting this justification,
I lose my sense that blame is unconditionally a matter of blameworthiness.
I may continue to accept that blame performs its function if treated as justi-
fied by moral reasons, but I can no longer genuinely take it to be so justified if,
all the while, I keep one eye cocked on the consequences of doing so. Taking
blame to be justified by its effects thus alienates me from the moral reasons
for blame by undercutting their autonomy and authority.
This holds even if one distinguishes, as Vargas (forthcoming-a) does,
between the broad church of instrumentalism and more particular denom-
inations of consequentialism—where the former, unlike the latter, include
20 Smyth (2019, 193), drawing on Williams (1981, 1995b, 2002, 91), offers the following helpful
description: “A settled disposition to avoid violence simply is the instinctive refusal to
commit acts of violence; once it is regulated by reflection on general consequences, it loses
the sense of ‘practical necessity’ which, Williams claimed, accompanies our most basic
ethical dispositions. This is what he meant when he described such dispositions as having
‘momentum,’ or, elsewhere, ‘a certain depth or thickness’: phenomenologically, they appear
as convictions that a certain behavior must or must not be performed.”
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approaches that see blame as justified by its consequences without being com-
mitted to the more general idea that anything that has value has it, ultimately,
in virtue of its consequences. It is true that the alienation effect becomes
even stronger in light of the consequentialist idea that blame’s justification in
terms of its consequences is the only justification there can ultimately be for
it, and that whatever authority non-instrumental reasons possess must derive
from the fact that treating these considerations as reasons promotes valuable
consequences. This consequentialist commitment, one might say, renders
the Justification Claim exhaustive, displacing any justification for blame that
does not derive from its functionality. But even without this consequentialist
commitment, the Justification Claim engenders the alienation effect, because
the moral reasons justifying blame themselves demand to be understood as
justifying it exhaustively.
Dale Miller (2014) has recently defended a consequentialist approach to
moral psychology against this objection by appealing to a Strawsonian view of
reactive attitudes. On Miller’s account, the Williamsian charge overlooks the
resilience of reactive attitudes. “None of us, not even the utilitarians among
us, can avoid experiencing the reactive attitudes in the ordinary way the vast
majority of the time” (2014, 54), so that occasionally taking a consequentialist
view of them, even if it means that we briefly experience them differently
(as bare feelings, for instance), will not and cannot prevent us from going
back to experiencing them as people ordinarily do. If consequentialists always
combined both styles of thought, Miller grants, Williams’s charge would be
successful (2014, 55). But to suppose that this is possible is, on Miller’s view,
once again to overlook the resilience of our reactive attitudes. We can put
them in abeyance only briefly, and cannot avoid experiencing them fully the
vast majority of the time.
Even supposing this line of defence to be successful in fending off
Williams’s charge, it could yield but a Pyrrhic victory, since in establishing the
powerlessness of consequentialist thinking to destabilize or otherwise alter
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our reactive attitudes in any lasting fashion, one also establishes its powerless-
ness to revise them for the better, thus rendering consequentialist reflection
pointless to begin with. In fact, however, the line of defence cannot be success-
ful, since it tries to put a psychological roadblock in the way of a philosophical
claim:
The point is that the thoughts are not stable under reflection; in particular,
you cannot think in these terms if at the same time you apply to the process
the kind of thorough reflection that this theory itself advocates. That is
not a merely psychological claim. It is a philosophical claim, about what is
involved in effective and adequate reflection on these particular states of
mind. (Williams 2006, 80)
In insisting not that the thoughts are unstable, but that they are unstable
under reflection, and that this is intended as a philosophical rather than as a
psychological claim,Williams is highlighting that the objection is aimed at the
agent’s idealized process of rational deliberation. As a matter of psychology,
our reactive attitudes may be resilient or hard to dislodge, and this may be a
blessing or a curse; but Williams’s point is that even if these obstacles could be
overcome and onewere to “apply to the process the kind of thorough reflection
that this theory itself advocates,” one would run into the alienation effect and
functional instability would ensue, because one would undercut the authority
of the very reasons that allow blame to stably perform its function in the first
place.
As against this, the self-effacing functionality account of blame offers an
external view of blame that can harmoniously and even comfortingly take its
place alongside the internal view:
Self -Effacing Functionality Account of Blame:
The explanation for why we think of blame as justified iff someone is blame-
worthy in virtue of having exhibited insufficient responsiveness to some
moral reason is that we need to think this way in order for blame to make a
useful difference to human life; although it can assuage certain doubts about
blame, however, this explanation is orthogonal to the question of whether
and when blame is justified.
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Here we avoid the alienation effect, because while the external view helps
us make sense of why we go on as we do, there is nothing in the external
view that conflicts with the view of blame we take from the inside. On the
contrary, this external view, unlike the others, offers an account of the relation
between the internal and the external view and helps us understand why the
internal and the external view differ as they do—the dynamics of self-effacing
functionality render intelligible how the non-instrumental reasons for blame
relate to the instrumental reasons for blame by explaining the former in terms
of the latter.
To sum up, the two distinctive features of the self-effacing functionality
account which allow it to avoid the alienation effect are, first, that it helps us in-
tegrate the inside and the outside perspective into one life, and second, that it
casts the insight into blame’s functionality in an explanatory rather than a justi-
ficatory role, thereby taking care not to harness the non-instrumental reasons
to the instrumental reasons for blame. The internal justification for blame
then receives explanatory support rather than competition from reflection on
the role of blame in human life.
5. Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to derive, from reflections on why blame could
not have developed in a purely instrumental form, an account of blame as a
self-effacingly functional practice. This account turns on the idea that blame’s
functionality presupposes its justification, and therefore its justification cannot
be identical with its functionality. In developing that account, I have cast
instrumental reasons for blame in an explanatory rather than a justificatory
role, thus allowing us to do better justice to the justificatory authority and
autonomy of non-instrumental reasons for blame; this is not only truer to the
phenomenology of blame, but also goes beyond the mere acknowledgment
that there are both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons for blame in
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highlighting the functional connection between them; and it avoids a problem
that other function-based accounts of blame tend to suffer from, of rendering
blame unstable under reflection by giving rise to the alienation effect.
The resulting picture does not justify blame as a practice; nor does it jus-
tify individual acts of blame. But it does offer a vindicatory explanation of
why it makes sense for us—and especially for us—not just to cultivate the
practice of blame in some form, but to cultivate it in a form that is guided and
justified by moral rather than instrumental reasons. This shows instrumental-
ists or consequentialists that, even on their own terms, it makes sense to resist
understanding the justification for blame in instrumental terms, because on
this understanding of what blame tries to achieve, there is simply no logical
space for it to succeed. Even from a benefit-minded perspective, therefore,
we are vindicated in being bloody-minded rather than benefit-minded about
blame.21
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